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Voting by Brazil, Israel, and Thailand in UN General Assembly Resolutions on the War in

Ukraine: A Comparative Analysis

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Abstract

This study examines the fluctuating voting behavior of states in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Following the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA on February 28, 2022, the research investigates the underlying factors influencing states' voting patterns and the discursive strategies employed to articulate national interests. Grounded in realism, the analysis focuses on the regions of Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, with particular attention to Brazil, Thailand, and Israel. Employing Van Dijk's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the study deciphers the rhetoric of representatives from these countries to reveal the role of the UNGA and how countries utilize this platform. The findings reveal that the rhetoric of Brazil, Israel, and Thailand at the Eleventh UNGA Emergency Special Session on the war in Ukraine was predominantly driven by their national interests, focusing on promoting peaceful dialogue and critiquing the liberal international order. The research acknowledges the limitations inherent in the qualitative CDA methodology and suggests future studies incorporate quantitative or mixed-methods approaches for broader conclusions. Consequently, this study extends the broader academic literature in realism and the critique of liberal international order, making it relevant for academics, policymakers, and practitioners seeking insights into the intricacies of international relations in times of crisis.

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Introduction

In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the international community confronted an unprecedented challenge that demanded swift and collective action. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) called for the Eleventh Emergency Special Session on February 28, 2022, which provided a platform where nations convened to comprehensively address the unfolding crisis, adopting six resolutions so far (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2022). The session in question plays a crucial role in the history of the UNGA and is characterized by an exceptional sense of urgency. Discussions within this issue unfolded against a backdrop of heightened tension, emphasizing the need for a meticulous understanding of the voting dynamics and behavioral shifts demonstrated by states. Moreover, in international politics, where national interests act as guiding beacons shaping state actions, each UNGA meeting becomes a battleground of ideas, providing a theater for expressing and defending these interests. In this context, the most powerful states shape and influence institutions, transforming them into “arenas for the actualization of power relations,” aiming to maintain or expand their influence (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 13). As Van Dijk (2009) aptly opines, contexts have a controlling power and can influence and control what people say and especially how they say. This assertion underscores the significance of considering broader contextual factors, such as sociocultural, political, and personal circumstances, in understanding how influential nations strategically navigate international institutions. For instance, Runde (2020) illustrates how influential nations, like China, strategically utilize the United Nations (UN) agencies as a platform to assert dominance, all within the controlling power of the surrounding context.

Within the resolutions on the current war in Ukraine, where every word carries weight, it is crucial to explore the discursive strategies employed by representatives of different countries in the UNGA to express their national interests. As it was highlighted by Ebim et al. (2022), language plays a pivotal role in molding the execution of actions and the conduct of global politics, possessing the power to construct positive and destructive changes. In other words, individuals receiving information are not merely passive listeners; they are subject to social influence and can be manipulated through text to

achieve political or economic objectives (Hall, 1973). Despite a profound understanding of the role language plays in this context, a significant research problem arises when scrutinizing states' voting behavior in UNGA resolutions on the war in Ukraine. The core issue in studying UN voting behavior lies in the complexity of deciphering countries' actions. While their verbal expressions may suggest a particular stance, unraveling the concealed national interests behind their words proves intricate. The added complexity of oscillating behavior further complicates understanding the motivations at the heart of researching UN voting patterns, presenting a fundamental challenge.

Proceeding to the literature analysis, existing studies on UNGA voting behavior delve into the underlying reasons behind general patterns exhibited by states. Key themes include exploring the impacts of factors like foreign aid, trade, and intensive lobbying on states' voting tendencies. Additionally, several studies converge on the notion that motives prompting vote shifts are systematically categorized within economic, defense cooperation, and soft power spheres. These studies precisely aim to unravel the complexities of why certain countries demonstrate more sympathetic attitudes towards Russia or Ukraine. A collective synthesis of the literature brings forth recurring themes, including economic dependence, military incentives, political ideology, and historical or personal affiliations. Moreover, in the exploration of theoretical approaches, this thesis deliberately focuses on realism as a framework providing nuanced insights into the intricate motivations that underpin states' behavior in the global arena. Grounded in the tradition of classical realism, studies within this framework emphasize human nature as a driving force for politicians' foreign policy decisions, rooted in self-interest and a pursuit of national survival in an anarchic international environment.

While existing research meticulously examines various factors influencing voting dynamics, a noticeable gap arises when discussing the discursive elements employed by countries in analyzing voting behavior amid the complex conflict in Ukraine. The identified area for further research pertains to the need for a deeper exploration of the specific discourse strategies employed by nations in shaping their positions during UNGA voting on the Ukraine conflict. The study aims to contribute to this area

by examining various aspects of voting behavior globally. Through thorough analysis, the intention is to identify distinctive shifts in voting and systematically analyze official statements at the UNGA, mainly focusing on the discursive aspects. The essence of the research lies in deciphering intricate discursive patterns strategically employed by countries to articulate their positions and influence the outcomes. These patterns are crucial in advancing national interests in the complex context of the Ukraine conflict.

The significance of this research lies in its in-depth analysis of states' voting behavior in the UNGA amid the Ukraine conflict. By addressing existing gaps in the literature and employing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the study provides valuable insights into how countries articulate their national interests. This contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding global diplomacy and power dynamics, making it relevant for academics, policymakers, and practitioners seeking insights into the intricacies of international relations in times of crisis. Additionally, by addressing the theoretical gaps from a realist perspective, the study offers a structured approach to unveiling the complex interactions of discursive dynamics shaping states' positions in UNGA voting. Therefore by exploring the uncharted aspect of discursive elements, the effort aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how these elements explain voting behavior at the UNGA in the context of the war in Ukraine.

The organizational framework of this paper is delineated as follows. The second section conducts a comprehensive literature review, exploring various explanations for potential mechanisms that drive countries to alter their votes, alongside reasons behind their voting behavior. It introduces the theoretical framework guiding this research. The third section details the systematic approach employed in this thesis, addressing research questions concerning fluctuating voting behavior in UNGA resolutions on the war in Ukraine. It covers key aspects such as case selection, the application of CDA, and the examination of official speeches of selected cases to comprehend their voting patterns and national interests. In the fourth section, the data analysis explicates patterns and provides insights through CDA of representatives' speeches. Finally, the fifth section presents results and engages in a

discussion of findings, while the final section synthesizes the research, offering a comprehensive conclusion.

Literature Review

The literature review consists of two main sections. The first section focuses on the literature related to voting behavior in the UNGA. The second section discusses the literature on particular theoretical approaches to explain the voting behavior of states in the UNGA.

The study of the voting dynamics of states in the UNGA is a crucial tool for understanding the direction of foreign policy (Ball, 1951). Delving into the intricacies of this diplomatic arena, where national interests manifest in significant votes, contemporary research focuses on uncovering potential explanations for voting changes during emergency UNGA sessions.

Within this framework, existing studies on countries' behavior in the UNGA often scrutinize the mechanisms by which bilateral trade and foreign aid from influential nations like the US and China shape voting patterns. Alexander and Rooney's (2019) research investigates whether the United States (US) utilizes foreign aid as a tool for “vote buying” in the UNGA. Carter and Stone (2015) also focus on how countries react to US influence through threats and manipulation of foreign aid, revealing that democratic nations are most susceptible to such influence. Bailey et al. (2017) propose a dynamic model for assessing states' ideal points in UNGA voting, exploring how preference choice impacts the democratic world. Additionally, the works of Brazys and Panke (2017a) shed light on the dynamics of “windows of opportunity” and intensive lobbying, influencing states' voting changes on recurring resolutions. These findings emphasize that financially constrained states may be more flexible in their voting positions on repeated international resolutions, making them more prone to changing their stances over time (Brazys & Panke, 2017b). In a broader context of analyzing factors influencing voting dynamics, Letican and Bigleiser (2022) investigate how US sanctions, especially when targeting aid-dependent countries, can influence voting similarity. The impact of natural resource exports and China's positive effect on political support on bilateral trade is studied by Che et al. (2021), Yan and

Zhou (2021), and Dreher et al. (2018), highlighting the voting alignment of some African nations with China's interests.

Literature in the academic sphere regarding the war in Ukraine is limited due to the relatively short time since this crisis garnered the global community's attention. Consequently, studies on the voting dynamics in the UNGA concerning the invasion of Ukraine primarily focus on identifying critical motives for choices and inconsistencies. This reflects a growing interest in understanding the intricacies of decision-making within the international community. Amighini and Herrero (2023) delve into the significance of various factors influencing countries' votes, categorizing them into economic, defense cooperation, and soft power spheres. Their findings reveal high voting model similarities when comparing and dividing votes along the Global South and Global North, as well as countries supporting the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) and those not involved in it. Farzanegan and Gholipour (2022) also concentrate on exploring potential economic-political, military, and historical-geographical factors that determine a country's voting behavior in favor of Russia, including the absence of military conflicts with the Soviet Union, political ideology similarity, and cooperation agreements in defense and trade. Additionally, empirical evidence supporting the relevance of trade and military ties with Russia, explaining why countries, especially in Africa, abstain or vote against the resolutions, is reiterated in various prominent media sources (Ajala, 2022; Busari, 2022; Cascais, 2022; Ryder & Kebret, 2022; Tawat 2022). In contrast, Mikami (2023) covers numerous resolutions and systematically examines factors such as existential threats, internal security dependence on Russia, historical friendship, and emotional considerations. Contrary to common belief, the research shows that factors like trade dependence and emotional considerations are insignificant, emphasizing the dominance of authoritarianism and concerns about undermining internal security dependent on Russia's assistance.

While the previous section covers a general collection of existing articles on the topic of states' voting behavior at the UNGA, the next section is devoted to the discussion of prominent theoretical approaches of the International Relations discipline that contribute to a deep comprehension of this phenomenon. In particular, the primary focus is explicitly given to realism.

Realism is not just a theory but an entire tradition of the International Relations discipline that encompasses diverse theoretical, methodological, epistemological, and ontological approaches (Smith, 2018). Hence, it is worth clarifying that the thesis is specifically concerned with the use of classical realism. Realist scholars often point to human nature as a key explanation for politicians' foreign policy decisions (Smith & Yuchshenko, 2021). In the context of this school of thought, individuals are seen as selfish, self-interested, and unconcerned with moral principles (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010; Schuett, 2010). The main motive centers on survival in an anarchic international environment, which requires pursuing national interests (Nyemba, 2021; Andreatta, 2005; Morgenthau, 1952). Furthermore, one of the most famous hard-boiled realists, Mearsheimer (1994), severely criticizes international institutions for failing to control the behavior of states (p. 47). This means states possess the will to pursue a coherent agenda of their interests, which is not influenced by international organizations such as the UN. Khan (2020), considering the applicability of the realist perspective, argues that states' voting behavior in the UNGA is determined by considerations of protecting sovereignty and perceived relative advantages, which also limits the possibility of cooperation between countries. Based on the fundamental tenets of classical realism, scholars have analyzed various state leaders participating in the UNGA, including Barack Obama (Kiogora, 2014) and Donald Trump (Ranchod, 2017), who, in their speeches, frequently prioritized the US national interests. Remarkably, the findings suggest that former US presidents often shifted the primary focus of the UNGA agenda from global issues, like the environment, to challenges associated with totalitarianism and authoritarianism.

Examining state voting dynamics in the UN General Assembly unveils a multifaceted global political landscape, where major powers and power-constrained states alike engage in a complex interplay of national interests. This revelation aligns with the existing literature, which has delved into understanding state voting behavior, particularly in the context of foreign policy dynamics. However, upon a thorough analysis, literature gaps become evident. Firstly, more comprehensive analyses are necessary, as existing studies often focus on individual resolutions rather than providing a holistic view of voting changes across multiple resolutions in the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA.

This limitation underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of states' evolving positions in response to the Ukraine crisis. Secondly, there is a dearth of research specifically addressing the voting behavior of countries concerning military actions in Ukraine. While the literature explores factors impacting voting dynamics, a focused analysis of how nations, specifically their leaders and representatives, respond to resolutions on armed conflicts in Ukraine is crucial for an extensive understanding of the states' national positions presented in this context. Thirdly, the existing literature predominantly emphasizes the influence of major powers, such as the US and China, on voting patterns. However, there needs to be more in-depth exploration into the voting trends of countries exhibiting distinctive voting behaviors diverging from other states. In fact, it can assemble a more comprehensive puzzle of state voting behavior at the UNGA. Thus, unraveling the intricacies of how these countries articulate their stances can contribute significantly to addressing these gaps and providing a more nuanced picture of the global response to the war in Ukraine.

Methodology

This thesis seeks to address the following research questions:

1. Which states exhibited fluctuating and distinctive voting behavior in the UNGA resolutions on the war in Ukraine?
2. What are the reasons for the fluctuating and distinctive voting behavior of states in the UNGA resolutions on the war in Ukraine?

The construction of a robust methodology for this thesis to provide conclusive answers to the research questions posed above consisted of three main steps: (1) selecting cases; (2) determining the case analysis and comparison method; (3) and finding sources for their subsequent analysis and comparison.

First of all, this thesis thoroughly scrutinized the states' votes on all resolutions adopted during the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA, centered on the war in Ukraine. The resolutions in question were ES-11/1, ES-11/2, ES-11/3, ES-11/4, ES-11/5, and ES-11/5. After assembling a

comprehensive overview of global voting patterns through the examination of publicly available data from the UN documents website (<https://research.un.org/en>), it was decided to focus on South America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. This strategic focus was determined based on observable and noteworthy voting behavior distinctions (Table 1). Within these regions, Brazil, Israel, and Thailand were the nations that displayed the most notable and interesting voting patterns (Table 2). This is why they were chosen as the main cases for this thesis. In addition to the volatility of their votes, the sample of these cases is justified by the fact that crucial data such as the availability of their speeches at the UNGA is sufficient for their comprehensive consideration. Another important rationale for the case sample is the point that while Brazil, Israel, and Thailand are similar on the issue of erratic voting patterns, they differ significantly on many other aspects. For example, in terms of the political system, Brazil holds a presidential system (Ribeiro & Fabre, 2020), Israel contains a parliamentary system (Tuttnauer, 2020), and Thailand has a constitutional monarchy (Lockhart, 2022). The justification for using such a case sample is defined by Most Different System Design (MDSD). According to MDSD, it is essential to select cases that are substantially dissimilar from each other but lead to the same outcome (Steinmetz & Null, 2021). This approach allows the thesis to reveal whether there are generalized patterns or common causal mechanisms between states as different as Brazil, Israel, and Thailand.

Secondly, to analyze and compare the fluctuating voting behavior of Brazil, Israel, and Thailand in the UNGA, this dissertation applies discourse analysis. This qualitative method is based on the conceptions of interpretivism and constructivism. While the former assumes that the meanings of political actors' actions lie in their shared beliefs, values, and ideologies, the latter emphasizes that these meanings are also socially and discursively constructed. This means that discourse analysis has two primary goals: identifying meanings and uncovering how these meanings are constructed within different forms of texts, including the official speeches of political actors. Although there are various types of discourse analysis, this thesis employs CDA in particular. The approach seeks to analyze how influential groups, through their power, define discourse. These influential groups include professors, journalists, lawyers, and politicians (Halperin & Heath, 2020). It is especially important as this feature

of CDA coincides with the primary subjects of this thesis's examination – ambassadors; they also fall into the category of specific actors who have the power, though not to shape but to broadcast the chosen political discourse of their leaderships. To reinforce the argument in favor of using this method with supplementary reasoning, it is worth noting that critical areas of CDA, in addition to power, are domination, hegemony, ideology, social structures, social order, class, gender, race, discrimination, as well as institutions and interests (Van Dijk, 2015). It is the latter two aspects, in conjunction with the concept of power, that this thesis is concerned with. Consequently, using CDA allows this thesis to focus on how countries such as Brazil, Israel, and Thailand, through power, employ an institution such as UNGA as a platform to promote their national interests.

Finally, applying CDA, this thesis comprehensively examined official records of speeches made by ambassadors of Brazil, Israel, and Thailand at the plenary meetings of the UNGA in 2022 and 2023 on the war in Ukraine, i.e., on the resolutions adopted during the Eleventh Emergency Special Session. Specifically, the thesis analyzed fourteen speeches — five from Brazil and Thailand and four from Israel — delivered at the third, fifth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, fourteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth plenary meetings (Appendix 2). H.E. Mr. Costa Filho and H.E. Mr. De Almeida Filho spoke on behalf of Brazil, while the ambassadors of Israel were H.E. Mrs. Noa Furman and H.E. Mr. Gilad Erdan, along with representatives from Thailand H.E. Mr. Suriya Chindawongse and H.E. Mr. Supark Prongthura. The number of plenary sessions is considered appropriate, since it provided a sufficiently extensive and substantial base of discourse by Brazil, Israel, and Thailand on the war in Ukraine. The records of the plenary meetings were accessed via the official website of the UN-affiliated Dag Hammarskjöld Library (<https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/emergency>). Also, all speeches were analyzed in English in the official UN translation, so there were no difficulties with the accuracy of the transmitted information that could potentially arise from relying on unofficial translations. Studying such sources is one of the most accessible and reliable ways of comprehending the common discourse of various nations. In the context of this thesis, it can, either explicitly or implicitly, indicate states' positions on the war in

Ukraine, their national interests, which are sometimes articulated by their representatives, and the rationale behind their voting patterns in the UNGA.

Data Analysis

The data analysis section begins by offering a detailed summary of all resolutions, including the subjects addressed and the voting results from each participating country. This serves as a foundation for conducting a chronological CDA, which examines key points and primary themes in the country speeches throughout each plenary meeting. The analysis then systematically explores common patterns and discrepancies in the discourse. Additionally, it investigates the factors influencing discourse and integrates relevant background information. Through this framework, the analysis aims to achieve a nuanced understanding of the diplomatic dynamics inherent in the resolutions being examined.

Resolutions

As of February 2024, the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA has adopted six resolutions addressing the current situation in Ukraine. Brazil, Israel, and Thailand participated in each of them, expressing hesitancy in their voting behavior.

At Resolution ES-11/1, which took place on March 2, 2022 i.e., six days after Russia invaded Ukraine, the main subject on the agenda was aggression against Ukraine. The resolution condemned Russia's aggression and demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. It also called for the revocation of the decision to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. Brazil, Israel, and Thailand were among the countries that voted in favor of the resolution.

The next stage was Resolution ES-11/2, held on March 24, 2022. The main subject was devoted to the humanitarian consequences of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The resolution expressed regret and grave concern and condemned Russia's attacks on the civilian population and infrastructure of Ukraine. The Brazilian, Israeli, and Thai parties voted in favor of approving Resolution ES-11/2.

Following the adoption of Resolution ES-11/3 on April 7, 2022, there has been a noticeable divergence and hesitation in the voting behavior of states. The core focus of the resolution was the suspension of Russia's membership rights in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), owing to its consistent and severe human rights violations. While Israel favored Resolution ES-11/3, Brazil and Thailand chose to abstain from voting.

In Resolution ES-11/4, adopted on October 12, 2022, the UN General Assembly called for Russia to revoke its decisions regarding the annexation of Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, and Kherson regions of Ukraine. The resolution stressed that these actions violated Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, contradicting principles outlined in the UN Charter. Notably, Brazil and Israel demonstrated a unified stance by voting “yes,” aligning themselves with the resolution's objectives during this meeting, while Thailand decided to abstain.

Moving on to Resolution ES-11/5, addressed on November 14, 2022, highlighted the UNGA's acknowledgment that Russia must be held accountable for violating international law in Ukraine. It emphasized consequences, including reparations, for Russia's actions, with Brazil, Israel, and Thailand abstaining from voting, indicating a nuanced position on the issue.

Subsequently, Resolution ES-11/6, held on February 23, 2023, addressed the urgent need for Russia to immediately and unequivocally withdraw all armed forces from Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. The resolution emphasized the cessation of hostilities and expressed regret over the severe human rights and humanitarian situation resulting from Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Brazil, Israel, and Thailand voted “yes,” demonstrating a unified stance supporting these measures during this pivotal stage of the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA.

These divergent voting patterns highlight Brazil, Israel, and Thailand's intricate dynamics and evolving perspectives in response to the multifaceted situation in Ukraine during the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA.

Brazil

In a nuanced exploration of the representative discourse of Brazil, Israel, and Thailand during the UNGA plenary meetings, particularly addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict, an in-depth discourse analysis unveils distinctive linguistic patterns, framing strategies, and alignments within each nation's foreign policy stance.

From the beginning, with Resolution ES-11/1, which sought to highlight Russia's aggression against Ukraine, Brazil made its position quite unclear. At the 5th meeting, which took place on March 2, 2022, the official representative of Brazil was H.E. Mr. Costa Filho, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN. One of his primary tools for conveying Brazil's approach was diplomatic language. He repeatedly mentioned the need to achieve peace, ceasefire, resumption of constructive dialogue, de-escalation, reaching an agreement, and respect for the basic principles of the UN and international humanitarian law. This approach emphasizes Brazil's dedication to global peace and stability. Yet, it is noteworthy that the Brazilian side urged both countries, Russia and Ukraine, to comply with the above measures. The absence of public condemnation of the Kremlin's aggression indicates that Brazil tried to remain neutral in this conflict. However, if not Russia, the UN itself was condemned. Mr. Costa Filho claimed, "it is regrettable that the supportive role that the UN can and should be playing has fallen by the wayside, owing to an eagerness to point fingers." This leads to the assumption that by employing such rhetorical methods as a way of conveying its national position, Brazil displays its dissatisfaction with the current circumstances at the UN. Afterward, it was added to the above indictment that "this resolution should not be seen as permitting the indiscriminate application of sanctions and the deployment of arms." In other words, Brazil explicitly disapproves of Russia being covered by universal censure and using measures such as the deployment of weapons or the imposition of sanctions (A/ES-11/PV.5). Thus, in UNGA Resolution ES-11/1, Brazil used a synthesis of diplomatic language and condemnation of UN measures to display both its commitment to harmony and its neutrality in this situation.

The 9th plenary meeting, on March 24, 2022, was convened to discuss Resolution ES-11/2 on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine. H.E. Mr. Costa Filho spoke on behalf

of Brazil. In his speech, remaining true to diplomatic language, he stated that the time had come for an urgent solution to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, which was causing suffering for thousands of civilians. Furthermore, he called on all UNGA participants, including Russia and Ukraine, to respect humanitarian law, cease hostilities, and remind the international community of the importance of all states' sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity. Notwithstanding, Mr. Costa Filho also criticized the UN for “the gradual erosion of the rules prohibiting the use of force” and failure “to speak with one voice today.” Additionally, his rhetorical device of “war begins when diplomacy fails” clearly signals Brazil's frustration with the UN's approach. A key element of his speech was his denunciation of “indiscriminate economic sanctions.” Brazil considers the imposition of sanctions on Russia to be wrong as such measures

“not only add to the hardships of economies that are already strained as they recover from the pandemic, but will probably also hit their most vulnerable populations” (A/ES-11/PV.9).

Such moments explicitly indicate that the Brazilian side has a rather critical view of the UN and the application of sanctions by the rest of the Western countries.

During the 10th plenary meeting held on April 7, 2022, the topic of discussion was Resolution ES-11/3, which focused on suspending the membership rights of the Russian Federation in the UNHRC. Brazil's representative at the meeting was H.E. Mr. Costa Filho. Throughout his speech, Mr. Costa Filho used expressions of concern about the gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Ukraine and support for all victims who had to face the consequences of the war. Thus, in defining the power dynamics in Mr. Costa Filho's discourse, it can be assumed that Brazil positioned itself as a human rights defender. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that the Brazilian side decided to abstain from Resolution ES-11/3, justifying its choice by arguing that “the commission of inquiry should be allowed to complete its independent investigation so that responsibilities can be ascertained” (A/ES-11/PV.10).

On October 12, 2022, the 14th plenary meeting was devoted to discussing the adoption of Resolution ES-11/4, the subject of which was the territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the

principles of the Charter of the UN. Brazil, represented by H.E. Mr. De Almeida Filho, argued on the significance of respecting the territorial integrity of all states, and that international law and the Charter of the UN should be respected and preserved. In addition, it is worth noting that Brazil expressed its disappointment that states still threaten each other with nuclear weapons. Instead, Mr. De Almeida Filho said that “opening avenues for dialogue is our only option out of the conflict. These points demonstrate Brazil's commitment to a rules-based international order and conflict resolution “through diplomacy and political dialogue.” Notwithstanding, Brazil also expressed its frustration that its proposed initiative “to include a clear message urging the parties to cease hostilities and engage in peace negotiations was not included in the draft” (A/ES-11/PV.14). This aspect of De Almeida Filho’s speech is indicative of the fact that Brazil has its own specific agenda or perspective it wishes to promote.

Brazil, for the first time in the entire Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA, decided to remain silent (as well as abstain from voting) at the 15th plenary meeting, which took place on November 14, 2022, and was devoted to the discussion of Resolution ES-11/5 and the issue of furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine. For this reason, it is worth going straight to the analysis of the 19th plenary meeting, which took place on February 23, 2023, one year after the commencement of Russia's war against Ukraine. The primary topic of Resolution ES-11/6 was the principles of the UN Charter underlying a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine. The representative of Brazil was once again H.E. Mr. Costa Filho. He mentioned that the primary objective of the UNGA is “to reaffirm its unwavering commitment to upholding the core principles of the Charter of the UN and international law while underscoring the need to reach peace.” Furthermore, the Brazilian side emphasized the significance of diplomatic dialogue, the adherence to respect for international humanitarian law, and the cessation of hostilities in order to reach the much-awaited peace in Ukraine (A/ES-11/PV.19).

Looking from an overall perspective, the most common themes in Brazil's discourse at the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA were liberal sentiments such as the establishment of peaceful dialogue. However, another central aspect in the speeches of H.E. Mr. Costa Filho and H.E.

Mr. De Almeida Filho focused on criticizing the UN and its use of sanctions as punishment for Russia. These are two completely different directions in Brazil's position, but both are important pillars of CDA, as they are indicative of the state's covert pursuit and pushing of its national interests in the UNGA.

Brazil's frequent references to the importance of promoting peaceful dialogue are not just words but active steps and initiatives to successfully put them into practice. For example, in 2023, Brazil advocated the creation of a group of countries whose primary goal was to find ways to achieve peace. To achieve this goal, Brazil's current president, Lula da Silva, traveled to countries such as China, Portugal, Spain, and the UK, where he promoted the necessity of shining a light on peace and taking the path of dialogue and diplomacy. Moreover, visits were also made by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, who went to both Russia and Ukraine to assess the chances of the major parties to the conflict to participate in the negotiations (Vasconcellos De Carvalho Motta & Succi Junior, 2023). Consequently, such activities may indicate that Brazil is manifestly pursuing its national interests in strengthening and enhancing its influence and role as a global peacekeeper. Also, it is worth adding that this trait has always been part of Brazil's foreign policy. Even before the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, Brazil often participated in the work of multiple UN entities, including the GA, the Security Council, the HRC and Peacekeeping Commission, and various UN-led operations, demonstrating thereby its commitment to peace (Hirst, 2015). The paradox, however, is that despite such an active presence at the UN, Brazil continually unleashes a barrage of criticism on the liberal international order.

Brazilian President Lula, when asked who was to blame for the outbreak of war, noted that even though Putin should not have attacked Ukraine, the US and the European Union (EU) were also culpable for not officially forbidding Ukraine from joining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On another occasion, Lula criticized the US and EU for contributing to the deepening of the conflict and not discussing peace. Such accusations towards the West came not only from Lula but also from the previous Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, who held office from 2019 to 2022. Bolsonaro began criticizing the UN when he started his election campaign in 2018. For example, he declared that Brazil would withdraw from the UN, later clarifying that he meant the UNHRC, which, in any case, did not

happen (Vasconcellos De Carvalho Motta & Succi Junior, 2023). It is considered that he used this rhetoric to gain support from the conservative part of the population (Casarões & Barros Leal Farias, 2022). Furthermore, based on the discourse of H.E. Mr. Costa Filho and H.E. Mr. De Almeida Filho, it is clear that Brazil is quite critical of imposing sanctions on Russia. It is worth noting that Brazil has consistently held this view of sanctions and has also provided assistance in circumventing them to specific countries (Chivvis & Geaghan-Breiner, 2023; Chingono et al., 2012). It is essential to remember that in the 1980s, Brazil was also under sanctions imposed by the US Congress for prosecuting nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology (Stuenkel, 2014). Thus, one can assume that Brazilian officials, by hurling accusations against the liberal international order, are not only trying to promote a communal scene in the global political landscape where the culprits are the UN, the US, and the EU, and the savior is Brazil itself, but also have its historical grievances and pretensions regarding the use of the instrument of punishment such as sanctions.

Israel

At the 9th plenary meeting held on March 24, 2022, during which Resolution ES-11/2 was adopted, H.E. Mrs. Noa Furman assumed the role of the representative from Israel. Notably, this resolution stands as the sole instance where Israel provided commentary on its position and actions in response to the prevailing circumstances. Throughout her speech, Mrs. Furman strategically employed phrases like “humanitarian assistance” and “humanitarian efforts” to portray Israel as actively addressing the humanitarian consequences of Russian aggression. The statement, “we will extend a helping hand to them, as has always been Israel’s custom in such crises,” utilizes rhetorical emphasis to convey the tradition and reliability of Israel's humanitarian response, reinforcing a consistent commitment to aiding those in need. Moreover, Mrs. Furman's mention of positive relations with both parties and active involvement in mediation efforts, positions Israel as a diplomatic mediator actively engaged in seeking a resolution to the tragic war (A/ES-11/PV.9). These linguistic choices collectively construct a discourse emphasizing Israel's multifaceted approach: maintaining a longstanding

humanitarian tradition, and actively participating in diplomatic endeavors to address the broader consequences of the Ukrainian conflict.

During the 3rd plenary meeting, which served as a continuation of the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA, H.E. Mrs. Noa Furman also held the position of a speaker. Linguistically, the Israeli representative employed assertive language, condemning Russia's actions as a “serious violation of the international order” and emphasizing the destructiveness of war. This choice of language not only conveys a clear disapproval but also strategically positions the actions in question as a breach of established global norms and diplomatic principles. Additionally, the recurrent use of phrases like “territorial integrity,” “sovereignty,” and “diplomatic efforts” underscores Israel’s commitment to global peace and stability (A/ES-11/PV.3). Nevertheless, by highlighting Israel's longstanding and positive relations with both Russia and Ukraine, Mrs. Furman suggests a willingness to play a diplomatic role in mediating the conflict, aligning with Israel's interests in maintaining ties with both nations. In addition, the incorporation of the Prophet Isaiah's words adds a rhetorical layer, invoking a moral dimension to Israel's plea for peace and appealing to a broader audience within the UN.

In H.E. Mrs. Noa Furman's speech during the 11th plenary meeting on April 7, 2022, she strongly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, emphasizing Israel's firm stance against the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and the killing of innocent civilians. This condemnation is followed by Israel's support for Resolution ES-11/3, which addresses the suspension of Russia's membership rights in the UNHRC. The critical discourse emerges in Mrs. Furman's denunciation of the UNHRC, asserting a long-standing lack of credibility and accusing it of discriminatory practices against Israel. The phrase “for too long, it has discriminated against one State — the only Jewish State” and “the UNHRC is the clearest example of bias and discrimination in the UN’s system” implies a lack of impartiality in the Council's actions and raises questions about the fairness of its approach to member states (A/ES-11/PV.11). Moreover, the establishment of the latest commission of inquiry on Israel in May 2021, without addressing Hamas, suggests a biased and flawed nature of the Council, according to

Mrs. Furman. She characterizes it as aiming to continuously investigate and denounce Israel, portraying the situation as absurd. By referencing the attempt in 2006 to replace the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) with something better and asserting that, in Israel's view, it failed, Mrs. Furman criticizes the international community's efforts to reform human rights mechanisms.

During the 17th plenary meeting in February 2023, a meeting that marked the continuation of the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA, H.E. Mr. Gilad Erdan served as the representative from Israel. His opening address resonated with diplomatic significance as he expressed “steadfast support and solidarity” with Ukraine, emphasizing Israel's “wholehearted commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” This choice of expression serves as a diplomatic tool to bolster Israel's image as an engaged international actor. Moreover, Mr. Erdan strategically invokes the Jewish maxim “saving even one life is akin to saving the entire world” to highlight Israel's values-driven approach and emphasizes the ethical foundation of its actions. This rhetorical move is a calculated effort to appeal to shared moral principles within the international community. Furthermore, Mr. Erdan's characterization of Iran as a “global threat” employs strong language, amplifying the perceived danger and positioning Israel as a victim, thereby justifying the call for international action. The emphasis on acting “for the sake of the Iranian people, for the Middle East, for Ukraine, and for the sake of the world” strategically broadens the scope, framing Israel's call for intervention as a collective responsibility tied to global security and humanitarian concerns (A/ES-11/PV.17). This rhetoric seeks to construct a narrative where Israel is not merely protecting its own interests but acting as a vanguard against a broader menace, emphasizing the urgency of global collaboration.

The discourse of Israeli representatives in the plenary meetings revolves around several key points and primary themes. These include diplomatic mediation, commitment to global peace, humanitarian assistance, and the assertion of state interests, as they consistently emphasize Israel's role as an active responder to global conflicts while also advocating for diplomatic solutions and condemning violations of international norms, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, Israeli representatives critique international bodies, particularly the UNHRC, for perceived bias and

discriminatory practices against Israel. This systematic examination reveals a coherent strategy aimed at advancing Israel's national interests and realist perspectives in the international arena.

In the context of the conflict in Ukraine, Israel finds itself in a complex and delicate position. Traditionally, close ties with the US exert pressure on Israel to align with Washington's condemnation of the Russian invasion. However, Israel must also navigate its relationship with Russia, which plays a significant role in regional affairs, notably in the Syrian conflict and concerning Iranian interests. Consequently, Israel seeks to balance its support for Ukraine while maintaining constructive relations with Russia. Despite refusing to provide military assistance to Ukraine, Israel has engaged in substantial humanitarian efforts in the country. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its Agency for International Development Cooperation (MASHAV), dispatched 100 tons of humanitarian aid, including 17 tons of medical equipment and drugs, water purification systems, and emergency water supply kits (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Additionally, a field hospital was deployed in the town of Mostyska in the Lviv region. Furthermore, in June 2023, Israel pledged to allocate \$200 million in loans for healthcare and civilian infrastructure, as well as assistance in developing an early warning intelligence system (Berman, 2023). Additionally, according to The Times of Israel, Foreign Minister Eli Cohen remarked that the total amount of humanitarian aid from Israel amounted to approximately \$22 million. In the same month, discussions were also held regarding the possibility of a meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. This became relevant in the context of Israel's desire to garner support from the US and a potential meeting with President Biden, as Netanyahu was not invited to Washington in March. Thus, as the Ukrainian ambassador to Israel, Yevgen Korniychuk, noted, Netanyahu's support for Kyiv could increase the chances of an invitation to the White House (Berman, 2023).

Despite Israel's provision of humanitarian aid, Ukrainian officials have criticized the Israeli government's perceived neutrality, viewing it as a “clear pro-Russian position” (Shmigel, 2023). This duality approach stems from Israel's security concerns, prompted by the presence of Russian armed forces in Syria and former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's sharp statement that providing

military aid to Ukraine could worsen relations with the Kremlin (Polyakova, 2022). Western countries continue to urge Israel to provide military assistance to Ukraine, considering the renown of the Iron Dome air defense system. However, Israel's approach is geared towards balancing internal security interests with foreign policy, leading to a cautious stance on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In response to Israel's uncertainty, Ukraine supported an initiative on November 11 at the Fourth Committee of the UNGA to seek an urgent advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding the prolonged occupation, settlement, and annexation of Palestinian territory by Israel (Tress, 2022). This move drew dissatisfaction from Israeli authorities, leading Israel to abstain from voting on UNGA Resolution ES-11/5 adopted on November 14 regarding reparations for Ukraine (A/RES/ES-11/5). Additionally, such a decision may have been influenced by Israel's fear that adopting a resolution on reparations for Ukraine would set a precedent affecting issues related to Palestinian refugees.

While the voting dynamics in the UNGA underscore Israel's deep relations with the US and the West, the country still needs to maintain its neutrality and effectively leverage its relationships with various blocs. For instance, despite Israel voting in favor of Resolution ES-11/1 to downplay Israel's significance and prevent potential diplomatic conflict with Russia, Israel appointed Deputy UN Ambassador Noa Furman instead of Ambassador Gilad Erdan during the Emergency Session, with Erdan's office refraining from any official comments (Magid, 2022). Israel's support for Ukraine in resolutions is driven by its heightened interest in aligning with Western democracies, considering its long-standing pro-Western orientation, particularly in its military-economic relations with the US. Thus, Israel stands out as the largest recipient of US vetoes in the UN, underscoring the special relationship between the two countries and shielding against UN resolutions condemning Israeli policies violating human rights (Middle East Monitor, 2022). For a long time, Israel and the US have accused the UN of bias against the Jewish state, which adopted a total of 14 resolutions against Israel in 2023 (UN Watch, 2023). Israeli policymakers also call on the UN to change its attitude towards Israel, accusing the organization of “baseless criticism” of antisemitism within its ranks and urging condemnation of

“Iranian subversion and Palestinian terrorism” (Tress, 2023). Hillel Neuer, executive director of UN Watch, also notes that “the politicization and selectivity of the UN undermine the authority of what should be an impartial international body” (UN Watch, 2023). It is also worth noting that despite the support of the US, Israel failed to sever economic ties and impose sanctions against Moscow, including against Russian oligarchs close to Putin, as the Israeli government believes there was no legal basis for imposing sanctions on assets and citizens of a state not legally defined as a hostile country (Freedman, 2022).

In conclusion, the analysis of Israel's position in the context of the war in Ukraine confirms its endeavor to advance its national interests. The intricate diplomatic maneuvers aimed at balancing support for Ukraine while strengthening relations with both Russia and the West demonstrate a strategic approach to ensuring security and stability in the country.

Thailand

At the 5th plenary meeting on March 2, 2022, H.E. Mr. Chindawongse spoke on behalf of Thailand. Thailand voted in favor of Resolution ES-11/1, explaining its decision that they

“attach to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the UN and those of international law, particularly respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and the non-use of force against them” (A/ES-11/PV.5).

This indicates that Thailand, like Brazil and Israel, adheres to diplomatic language as the primary discourse strategy in its speeches. Additionally, Mr. Chindawongse expressed his heartfelt feelings about the plight of the affected people who have suffered in the fighting and violence “in the area.” The fact that Mr Chindawongse deliberately does not mention the parties to the conflict, neither Russia nor Ukraine, using over-the-top signposts such as “in the area” and the absence of accusations against the conflict's perpetrator displays that the country does not want to make hasty decisions. This is also evident in Mr. Chindawongse's call for “all parties (both Russia and Ukraine) to enhance dialogue through various means in order to truly achieve a peaceful settlement to the situation.”

During the 9th plenary meeting held on March 24, 2022, on Resolution ES-11/2, the representative of Thailand was H.E. Mr. Prongthura. It is worth noting that Thailand was more confident in its expressions this time, referring for the first time to Ukraine and expressing “deep concern about the ongoing humanitarian crisis.” Mr. Prongthura also noted that Thailand “commend Ukraine's neighbors and the other States that have quickly mobilized humanitarian assistance for those in need.” Besides Mr. Prongthura mentioned the importance of respecting international law, humanitarian law, and establishing a dialogue between Russia and Ukraine, he took time at the end of his speech to recognize the efforts that Thailand has made to improve the situation of those affected, “We have provided humanitarian assistance, including food, medical and other essential supplies, through the Red Cross Society of Ukraine.”

Thailand, at the 10th plenary meeting on April 7, 2022, decided to abstain from voting on Resolution ES-11/3, with the explanation that

“the process must be done through careful consultations, based on principles and verified facts and taking into account constructive opinions as well as foreseeable consequences”
(A/ES-11/PV.10).

Also, Thailand's representative, H.E. Mr. Chindawongse, expressed his deepest regrets to the people of Ukraine and his concern over the escalation of the conflict. In this regard, remaining true to diplomatic language, Thailand reiterated its call on Russia and Ukraine to respect humanitarian and international human rights law, protect citizens, and provide humanitarian support without discrimination. H.E. Mr. Chindawongse used the phrase “another life lost is another life too many,” the rhetorical function of which was to draw the attention of the international community to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. Furthermore, Thailand noted that the country continues to provide humanitarian aid to people affected by the hostilities and pointed out that the only viable way to seek peace is to establish a political dialogue between Russia and Ukraine.

At the 14th plenary meeting on October 12, 2022, Thailand abstained from voting on Resolution ES-11/3. According to Thailand's representative, H.E. Mr. Chindawongse, despite being a “small,

sovereign nation” that respects the Charter of the UN and international law and is opposed to the use of violence or threat of force when it comes to the sovereignty of other countries, the process of adopting the resolution was “in an extremely volatile and emotionally charged atmosphere and situation,” which in turn reduces the chances of peaceful negotiations and increases the likelihood of “nuclear war and global economic collapse” (A/ES-11/PV.14). Under the notion of an “extremely volatile and emotionally charged atmosphere and situation” that prevented the country from voting in favor of the resolution, Mr. Chindawongse refers to “increased politicization of international principles” and that “condemnation (of Russia) provokes intransigence.”

Finally, at the 19th plenary meeting on February 23, 2023, H.E. Mr. Chindawongse spoke on behalf of Thailand. He highlighted approaches that Thailand believes are exacerbating the crisis in Ukraine, including the politicization and discriminatory nature of humanitarian issues, increased weaponry and fighting, additional sanctions, and “the morality play that turns very complex situations into simple binaries of good and evil, followed by finger-pointing and condemnations (of Russia)” (A/ES-11/PV.19). Instead of “adding fuel to the fire,” stakeholders should work to create conditions conducive to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, specifically through engagement and dialogue. Thus, Mr. Chindawongse concluded his speech by noting “diplomacy is the continuation of war by other means” and referring to Isaiah 1:18 “it is now time for all nations to come and ‘reason together’,” implying that only engagement, dialogue, and pragmatism are the most appropriate means of peacemaking.

Summarizing all of the above, the Thai representatives most frequently asserted the significance of complying with international law and international humanitarian law, calling on all parties to provide humanitarian assistance, noting that Thailand itself is actively assisting in this matter, as well as promoting dialogue between Russia and Ukraine. Notwithstanding, it is clear from the Thai side's speeches that the country does not welcome specific approaches taken by other countries aimed at condemning Russia, imposing additional sanctions on it, and sending weapons to Ukraine. Moreover,

throughout all the speeches, Thailand never once mentioned Russia, which genuinely reveals that the country does not denounce the conflict's instigator.

As part of shaping its foreign policy stance regarding the military conflict in Ukraine, Thailand has advocated for maintaining neutrality, preferring participation in international actions through voting in the UN. In line with this stance, the Thai government reacted passively to aggression towards Ukraine. Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai noted that hasty condemnation of Russia does not contribute to improving the situation and that Thailand supports Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) stance by underlying the importance of the principles of "mutual respect for sovereignty (Thai PBS World, 2022)." In this context, Bangkok decided not to impose sanctions on Russia and not to supply weapons to Ukraine (Chivvis et al., 2023). Such hedging corresponds to Thailand's desire to balance its national interests and diplomatic relations with various countries, including Russia. For example, during the voting in the UNGA, Thailand voted similarly both in favor and abstained on some resolutions. In this way, Thailand abstained from voting on the suspension of Russia's membership in the UNHRC (ES-11/3), explaining its choice due to adhering to a "transparent, impartial, and inclusive approach in the multilateral regime," as well as on Resolutions ES-11/4 and ES-11/5 (Thai PBS World, 2022). It is worth considering the possibility that Thailand's abstention from voting at the UNGA may have been driven by a desire to attract the participation of high-ranking leaders and avoid unnecessary friction with Russia ahead of the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Bangkok in November 2022, which the country was hosting (Sanglee, 2022). Although the connection between Thailand's voting at the UNGA and the upcoming APEC Summit is challenging to prove, it explains what could otherwise appear as Thailand consistently abstained from voting on several resolutions, such as ES-11/4 and ES-11/5, adopted a month or several days before the summit.

Furthermore, Thailand actively utilizes its position in the UN to advance its economic and geopolitical interests. Long-standing diplomatic ties with Russia are crucial in shaping Thailand's neutral stance on the conflict. Therefore, the desire to cooperate with Russia within the proposed free

trade deal with the Eurasian Economic Union appears logical (Asri, 2023). Additionally, in February 2022, a meeting between Mr. Thongphakdi and Russian envoy Evgeny Tomikhin was organized to discuss various aspects of bilateral relations (Bangkok Post, 2022). Prime Minister General Prayut emphasized the importance of long-term relations between Thailand and Russia, highlighting the need for a cautious approach to these relationships (The ASEAN Post, 2022). Moreover, following the 2014 military coup, Thailand has also engaged in cooperation with Russia in the military-industrial sphere (Thai PBS World, 2022). However, it is evident that Russia is not as pivotal a trade partner or significant source of arms as Vietnam or Myanmar, so Thailand does not incur substantial losses in its relations with Russia. Accordingly, analyzing the country's motives and context provides an understanding that Thailand is likely seeking to maintain its independence in decision-making on the world stage, which is crucial for safeguarding the country's national interests and sovereignty.

Findings

The results obtained by applying CDA to the speeches of official representatives of Brazil, Israel, and Thailand at the Eleventh UNGA Emergency Special Session on the war in Ukraine indicate that the countries' rhetoric was often driven by the pursuit of their national interests. Moreover, there were specific common patterns among the selected countries, in particular, the establishment of peaceful dialogue and judgment of the framework of liberal global governance.

Elevation of National Interests Over the Liberal Agenda

All countries frequently emphasized the significance of promoting peaceful dialogue as the leading way to resolve the conflict. So, based on Brazil's speeches at the UNGA, it was clear that the country actively advocates the necessity of diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, this was also evident in its foreign policy actions, which aimed to implement initiatives to organize meetings between countries to find ways to achieve peace and engage in various UN entities. This proactive stance demonstrated that Brazil has consistently sought to strengthen and enhance its role in the international political arena.

As for Israel, in the context of diplomatic relations, the country aims to maintain neutrality and balance between various stakeholders. Israel's dual approach to participation in the UN reflects its strategic interest in promoting its national ambitions, such as ensuring security and preserving diplomatic relations between the West and Russia. Thailand, like other countries, supports the idea of peaceful dialogue to resolve conflicts. However, Thailand stands out with its more neutral position, driven by its support for ASEAN's calls for dialogue to settle and end the conflict, and potential long-term diplomatic ties with Russia. Thus, as part of its national strategy, Thailand adheres to a neutral position in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, aiming to ensure the preservation of the independence of its foreign policy from interference by external coalitions.

Critique of the Liberal International Order

The following essential pattern of Brazil and Israel was their constant criticism of the liberal international order. For example, Brazil's representatives in the UNGA, as well as its previous and current presidents, have actively criticized the UN, the US, and the EU for not only taking active measures to resolve the conflict in Ukraine but also for fomenting it by imposing sanctions on Russia. It is worth noting that Brazil itself was under US sanctions in the 1980s; since then, it has historically been against their application. Israel, in its engagement with the UN, underscores the shortcomings and biases of the UNHRC, highlighting its subjectivity, unequal recognition of Israeli rights, and the necessity to prioritize international resources towards real threats such as Iran or terrorist organizations in Palestine. This not only demonstrates Israel's pursuit of fair treatment for itself but also reflects its uncompromising stance on systemic deficiencies within international bodies that impact its position and security.

Conclusion

This research set out to determine the reasons for states' fickle voting behavior at the UNGA on the war in Ukraine. After examining all the resolutions of the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of

the UNGA, including ES-11/1, ES-11/2, ES-11/3, ES-11/4, ES-11/5, and ES-11/6, we have discovered that the regions of Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia demonstrated the most bizarre voting behavior. Brazil, Thailand, and Israel particularly distinguished themselves from other nations within these regions. Consequently, it became necessary to investigate the roots of the problem more thoroughly, therefore, having decided on a sample of cases, we applied Van Dijk's CDA to explore the rhetoric and discourse of the representatives of the selected countries in the plenary sessions. Our findings have highlighted the significant influence of national interests in shaping and advancing states' positions during UNGA deliberations, resonating with the theory of realism. This becomes evident as states strategically emphasize the primacy of state sovereignty and security concerns. Hence, our study extends the broad academic literature on realism and critique of the liberal international order by illuminating the key role of national interests and international organizations in contemporary global affairs.

However, it is crucial to acknowledge the limitations of this study, which future researchers can explore and uncover in their papers. First, our methodology was formed following a qualitative framework, CDA, notorious for its subjectivism and overlapping personal viewpoints. It is advisable to pay attention to quantitative methods for more extensive conclusions, as well as the possibility of developing a mixed-methods methodology. Second, our finding that national interests drive countries' behavior in the UNGA is limited due to the initial case sample, which consisted only of fluctuating countries. Other variations of the case sample must be examined to make more substantial claims about such a significant role of national interests. In addition, future researchers may consider adopting rational choice theory as an augmented option to explain the phenomenon of countries' behavior in the UNGA. Even so, what our study brings to bear on the presence of selfish goals in countries' inconsistent voting behavior at the UNGA has essential potential for further detailed study by future researchers.

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Appendix 1. Tables of Country Votes

Table 1.1: Latin America						
Countries/Country Groups	ES-11/1	ES-11/2	ES-11/3	ES-11/4	ES-11/5	ES-11/6
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
<i>Brazil</i> , Belize, Guyana, Suriname	<i>Y</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>Y</i>
Honduras	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y
Mexico	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador	A	A	A	X	A	A
Bolivia	A	A	N	A	A	A
Nicaragua	A	A	N	N	N	N
Venezuela	X	X	X	X	X	X

Table 1.2: Middle East and North Africa						
Countries/Country Groups	ES-11/1	ES-11/2	ES-11/3	ES-11/4	ES-11/5	ES-11/6
Kuwait, Qatar	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
<i>Israel</i> , Libya	<i>Y</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>Y</i>
Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y
Iraq	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y
Lebanon	Y	Y	X	Y	A	X
Morocco	X	X	X	Y	X	Y
Algeria	A	A	N	A	A	A
Iran	A	A	N	X	N	A
Syrian Arab Republic	N	N	N	N	N	N

Table 1.3: Southeast Asia						
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Countries/Country Groups	ES-11/1	ES-11/2	ES-11/3	ES-11/4	ES-11/5	ES-11/6
Myanmar, Philippines	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Timor-Leste	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y
Singapore	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y
Brunei Darussalam	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y
<i>Thailand</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>Y</i>
Vietnam, Lao PDR	A	A	N	A	A	A

Table 2: Countries with the most fluctuating voting dynamics

Resolution	Brazil	Israel	Thailand
ES 11/1 (Aggression against Ukraine)	Y	Y	Y
ES 11/2 (Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine)	Y	Y	Y
ES 11/3 (Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council)	A	Y	A
ES 11/4 (Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations)	Y	Y	A
ES 11/5 (Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine)	A	A	A
ES 11/6 (Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine)	Y	Y	Y

Appendix 2. List of Plenary Meeting Records

1. A/ES-11/PV.3. 1 March 2022
2. A/ES-11/PV.5. 2 March 2022
3. A/ES-11/PV.9. 24 March 2022

4. A/ES-11/PV.10. 7 April 2022
5. A/ES-11/PV.11. 7 April 2022
6. A/ES-11/PV.14. 12 October 2022
7. A/ES-11/PV.17. 22 February 2023
8. A/ES-11/PV.19. 23 February 2023

Source: <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/emergency>.