JUSTIFYING RUSSIAN SANCTIONS: QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE AND SECURITY EXCEPTIONS IN WTO LAW

ALBERTO PECORARO,
Senior Lecturer at the Chair of International Law of KAZGUU University, LLM International Law

The article analyses the Russian Federation embargo on food products' import produced in the EU. The author concludes that the Russian ban on food is a quantitative measure prohibited under Article XI of the GATT. The author expresses doubts about the validity of the measures taken for safety reasons in accordance with Article XXI. Finally, it is argued that the validity of measures with purposes of security under Article XXI's is unlikely to be successful.

Keywords: WTO law, dispute-settlement, GATT 1994, import bans, Russia-EU relations, sanctions, quantitative restrictions, security exceptions, measures of WTO members, consultations.

During August 2014, the economic battle set off by the crisis in Ukraine was escalated by the adoption by the Russian Federation of a ban on all fruits and vegetables from the EU. The Russian government did not make any allegation that the ban might be explained by food safety reasons.[1] These measures should rather be seen as countermeasures adopted in reaction of previous EU and US sanctions against the Russian Federation.[2] The ban has severely affected the agricultural sector of certain EU members, and Poland has consequently requested that the European Commission files a challenge against the Russian food ban at the WTO. The 31st October 2014 the EU requested consultations to be held with the Russian Federation, and as of 18 June 2015, a panel had been composed to hear the dispute.[3] This article considers the two parties' legal positions, their strengths, and their weaknesses. It considers that the quantitative restrictions countermeasures adopted by the Russian Federation clearly cannot be justified by the general exceptions contained in Article XX of GATT. The same can probably said of the security exception contained in GATT article XXI, even if its language is sufficiently ambiguous for Russia to make a reasonable case. In fact, Article XXI GATT cannot be applied in a vacuum, and must be interpreted by the means of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (or VCLT) at the light of existing customary international law on countermeasures. And Russia is unlikely to succeed in showing that it has respected the requirements imposed by these customary norms.

QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS: GATT ARTICLE XI

The measures adopted by the Russian Federation amount to a prohibition on the importation of certain EU products in the Russian Federation. As such, they fall under the purview of Article XI of the GATT.[4] This provision sets out a general prohibition on quantitative restrictions:

"No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party."

The scope of Article XI.1 is extremely broad. The panel in Japan-Semi-Conductors stated that Article XI encompasses "all measures instituted or maintained by a contracting party prohibiting or restricting the importation, exportation or sale for export of products other than measures that take the form of duties, taxes or other charges".[5] The measures adopted by the Russian Federation indeed deny EU products the opportunity to be imported in the Russian market.

Nevertheless, the prohibition on quantitative restrictions as set out in Article XI:1 of the GATT is not absolute. The GATT does provide exceptions to that fundamental principle. These exceptions permit the imposition of quantitative restrictions under limited conditions, when they are taken on certain policy grounds. Thus, under Article XI.2:

"2. The provisions of paragraph 1…shall not extend to the following:

(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party;

[1] Russia to extend ban on western foods imports until early 2016 // EU news and policy debates across languages. - http://www.euractiv.com/sections/agriculture-food/russia-extend-ban-western-food-imports-until-early-2016-315637 (23/06/2015).

[2] EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis // EU Newsroom. - http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm (23/06/2015).

[3] WTO Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS485 Russia – Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and Manufacturing Products. - https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds485_e.htm (23/06/2015).

[4] Испенбетова Л. А. Правовые и экономические проблемы вступления Казахстана в ВТО // Право и государство. № 2(67) 2015. – С. 43-49. - http://km.kazguu.kz/magazine/2672015 (23/06/2015).

[5] Japan-Semi-Conductors (1988) // Panel Report adopted on 4 may 1988, L/6309 – 35S/116, P. 104.







(b)Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade;

(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:

(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted; or

(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted, by making the surplus available to certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices below the current market level…."

Moreover, Article XII contains provisions that allow WTO members to impose quantitative restrictions in order to safeguard their balance of payments, as long as such restrictions do not exceed those necessary to forestall a serious decline in monetary reserves and that they be progressively relaxed. Article XVIII of the GATT determines less strict conditions for WTO developing state members that adopt quantitative restrictions on trade for the purpose of safeguarding their balance of payments. Yet, the ban adopted by Russia would hardly qualify for one of the exceptions listed above. The Russian Federation has not been seeking to restrict the quantities of like domestic products permitted to be marketed or produced, nor can it argue it has a temporary surplus of like domestic products that is must remove. And, finally, it is not experiencing any severe issue with its balance of payments.[6] Rightly so, the Russian government has not sought to justify its measures through the exceptions contained in Articles XI and XII of the GATT.

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS: GATT ARTICLE XX

Nonetheless, the fact that Russia's food ban goes against GATT Article XI does not spell that it violates the GATT. Indeed, that treaty contains some exceptions which can be invoked when a measure has been found to be inconsistent with another provision. Articles XX and XXI of the GATT could indeed be invoked by the Russian Federation to justify its GATT-inconsistent measure. Article XX contains some general exceptions, related for example to the protection of public morals or human, animal or plant life or health. Under Article XX:

"Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in the agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any member of a measure:

(a) necessary to protect public morals

(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health….

….

(g) relating to the conservation of exhausted natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restraints on domestic production or consumption."

The aim of Article XX of the GATT is to give to the contracting parties sufficient policy space to pursue some necessary non-economic policy goals, while ensuring that the parties do not abuse of this prerogative.[7] This said, Russia's food ban is arguably not justifiable under Article XX. First of all, it is important to note that the Russian Federation has never justified its ban on the grounds of health or conservation reasons. Thus, Article XX(b) and (g) cannot be of assistance to it. A more interesting perspective is presented by Article XX(a), on public morals. For a GATT-inconsistent measure to be provisionally justified by Article XX(a), that measure must be designed to protect public morals and necessary to fulfil that purpose.[8] The term public morals, which has been interpreted in the context of GATS by the panel in US-Gambling, is taken to mean "standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community of nations".[9] WTO members are left a wide margin of discretion to define and apply for themselves the concept of public morals. This suggests that a large range of concepts could be part of the policy objective of public morals.[10] Such a conclusion is confirmed by recent case-law: the panel in EC-Seal Products has conceded that Article XX(a) could be invoked to justify a EU ban on seal products.

Perhaps, the Russian Federation could make the argument that its ban is a reaction to the EU and US interference in Ukraine and their support for "war crimes" perpetrated by an "illegitimate" regime in the context of a civil war. The question is now whether a WTO panel would accept such an argument or would dismiss it. In practice, it may choose to simply assume that the argument is valid, as it did in China-

[6]Balance of Payments of the Russian Federation for 2014 // The Central Bank of the Russian Federation. - http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.aspx?file=credit_statistics/bal_of_payments_new_14_e.htm&pid=svs&sid=itm_48213 (23/06/2015).

[7]P.van den Bossche. The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Third Edition (2013), p545

[8]European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products. // Appellate Body Report, WT/DS400/AB/R WT/DS401/AB/R, 22nd May 2014, para 5.169.

[9]US-Gambling, Panel Report, WT/DS285/R10 November 2004,para III.26.

[10]European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products // Appellate Body Report. WT/DS400/AB/R WT/DS401/AB/R, 22nd May 2014, para 5.169.

Publications and Audiovisual Products, and proceed to the question of whether the measure at issue is "necessary" to protect public morals. According to the Appellate Body in China-Publications and Audiovisual Products the less restrictive the effect of the measure, the more likely it is to be characterized as necessary.[11] Consequently, if a member chooses to adopt a very restrictive measure it will have to ensure that all the relevant factors be weighed and that the resulting balance outweighs the measure's restrictive effects. In making this test of necessity, a panel will also look at available less trade-restrictive alternative measures.[12] The case of China-Publications and Audiovisual Products proves that it is difficult to satisfy this necessity test: in the specific case, the Appellate Body found that an a priori exclusion of foreign enterprises from the right to engage in importing audiovisual products was not necessary because there were feasible less trade-restrictive alternatives which achieved the same level of protection. Here we can only note that Russia's import ban is even more trade-restrictive than China's measures, which at least allowed the marketing of foreign audiovisual products. Hence, it is quite unlikely for the Russian Federation to prove that its measures are necessary within the meaning of Article XX(a) GATT.

THE SECURITY EXCEPTION: ARTICLE XXI

The security exception contained in Article XXI of the GATT might be of greater help for the Russian Federation. Indeed, Article XXI provides that:

"Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:

(b) to prevent any member from taking any action which it considers necessary for its essential security interests:

(iii) in time of war or other emergency in international relations"

Article XXI is unclear on whether its use is subject to review by a WTO Panel. That is because prima facie Article XXI provides that nothing prevents a member from taking action which it considers necessary for its essential security interests. The question of whether this exception is subject to legal review has never been definitely settled: up to date no panel pronounced itself on this question. There is indeed very little case-law involving Article XXI: one of the first panels established under the GATT, US-Export Restrictions (Czechoslovakia) saw the use of Article XXI as a defence. In that occasion the panel stated that "every country must be the judge in the last resort on questions relating to its own security…. on the other hand, every contracting party should be cautious not to take any step which might have the effect of undermining the General Agreement".[13] Moreover, the USA and the EC have also invoked Article XXI various other instances, against Argentina in 1982 and against Nicaragua in 1985.[14]

Thus, the Russian Federation may attempt to invoke Article XXI, and argue that its use as a justification is not subject to review by a WTO panel.

Yet, the author's opinion is that a WTO panel would affirm it can review a member's exercise of the Article XXI exception. It would come to this conclusion based on the context to Article XXI of the GATT. It must be remembered that Article II.2 of the WTO Agreement states that the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 … are integral parts of the WTO Agreement, binding on all Members.This includes the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) which applies alongside the GATT within the WTO Agreement and constitutes the context at the light of which the GATT's provisions must be interpreted.[15] Article 3.2 of the DSU, which states that the function of the WTO dispute settlement is to provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading system would militate against the abandonment by a panel of its right to review the use of the Article XXI exception by a state. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the previous panels which inconclusively examined Article XXI of the GATT without did so when the DSU did not exist and could not provide such a context to Article XXI.

Nevertheless, even if a panel might review the use of Article XXI, the article's plain wording is still extremely wide: it speaks of any situation of emergency in international relations. Here, the Russian Federation can advance the argument that the adoption of far-reaching sanctions by the EU and the USA has led to such a situation of emergency. To bolster its position, Russia may refer to several occasions in which western countries employed GATT Article XXI to justify sanctions against third countries. These include the EU's use of its "inherent rights" under Article XXI to suspend imports from Argentina in 1982, and the USA's justification of its embargo against Nicaragua in 1985.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION: SYSTEMIC INTERPRETATION AND COUNTERMEASURES

Article XXI seems to justify "any action which [Russia] considers necessary for its essential security interests". Yet, in interpreting Article XXI GATT a panel may look beyond the clause's plain wording or its immediate context. In doing so, it would follow an interpretative principle known as the principle of "systemic integration".[16]

[11]China-Publications and Audiovisual Products (2010). AB Report, para 4.11.

[12]China-Publications and Audiovisual Products (2010). Panel Report, para 7.759.

[13]US-Export Restrictions (Czechoslovakia) (1949), GATT/CP.3/SR.22.

[14]Security Exceptions, in Analytical Index of the GATT. - https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf (23/06/2015).

[15]P.Lindsay. The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure? // Duke Law Journal, Vol 52, p1277.

[16]Dirk M. Broekhuijsen. A Modern Understanding of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention (1969): A New Haunt for the Commentaries to the OECD Model? // Bulletin for International Taxation, 2013 (Volume 67), No. 9, p2.







According to this principle, treaties are not to be applied and interpreted in a vacuum: every treaty has a normative environment, or "system" which cannot be ignored. In other words, "all international law exists in a systemic relationship with other law".[17] This means that, in cases of uncertainty, rules of international law external to a treaty may be used to shed light on that treaty's meaning.

Systemic integration is embodied by Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which reads: "there shall be taken into account, together with the context: … any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." Article 31(3)(c) occupies a prominent place in the reasoning of various international tribunals. For instance, in US-Shrimp, the WTO Appellate Body used Article 31(3)(c) to refer to UNCLOS and the Convention on Biological Diversity when interpreting the term "exhaustible natural resources" in Article XX(g) GATT.[18] Also the ICJ applied the principle of systemic integration in its judgment to the Oil Platforms case. The dispute arose out of the destruction of three Iranian offshore oil platforms by the US Navy, with Iran arguing that such act constituted a breach of the provisions of the 1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States.[19] On the other hand, the US asserted that Article XX of that treaty enshrined its right to take forceful measures for security purposes. The court sided with Iran, holding that: "under the general rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, interpretation must take into account «any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties»…. The Court cannot accept that Article XX…. of the 1955 Treaty was intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules of international law on the use of force, so as to be capable of being successfully invoked, even in the limited context of a claim for breach of the Treaty, in relation to an unlawful use of force".[20]

In the same manner, we cannot presume that Article XXI GATT was intended to operate independently of the relevant rules of international law expressed in other treaties or in customary international law. This point was for instance raised by Nicaragua in USA – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, when it affirmed that the provision should have been interpreted in the light of the basic principles of international law and in harmony with the decisions of the United Nations and of the International Court of Justice.[21] Differently from the US measures in 1985, the Russian quantitative restrictions are a response to a previous round of sanctions adopted by another WTO member – the EU. They can be described as countermeasures, that is to say sanctions taken to respond to a prior negative action that would violate international law but for the prior wrong.[22] And Article XXI cannot then be interpreted by a WTO panel in a manner which contradicts the requirements laid down by international law for the lawfulness of countermeasures.

Countermeasures are lawful as long as they comply with a series of requirements that are laid down in customary international law, as codified by the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility. Under the principle of systemic interpretation, Article XXI GATT cannot be interpreted in a manner that would contradict such basic norms of customary international law. The interpretative tool provided by Article 31(3)(c) VCLT would arguably lead a WTO panel to consider such these norms as a benchmark against which to evaluate Russian measures. In order to be justifiable, a countermeasure must meet certain conditions. First of all, it must be taken in response to a previous international wrongful act of another State and must be directed against that State.[23] Secondly, the injured State must have called upon the State committing the wrongful act to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make reparation for it. It must also have notified the responsible state of any decision to take countermeasures and have offered to negotiate with that state. Finally, the effects of a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking account of the rights in question.[24] It is indeed generally agreed that all counter-measures must have some degree of equivalence with the alleged breach.[25] Moreover, countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international obligations owed to the state taking the counter-measures. Finally they shall not affect jus cogens obligations.

The burden of proof to justify a countermeasure lies on the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation would have to prove that its action was in response to a violation of international law by the EU, that it had called the EU to cease its actions, that it sought first a negotiated settlement, and that effects of the countermeasures are commensurate with the injury suffered by the EU. These requirements imposed by customary international law are quite onerous: up to date, only in one case has an international tribunal ruled in favor of a party arguing that it was adopting counter-measures.[26] Unluckily, it will be impossible here to discuss more in depth Russia's compliance with the customary rules on countermeasures. It will suffice to say that, for Russia, proving the lawfulness of such countermeasures will pose significant challenges.

CONCLUSION

The Russian federation has adopted and maintained very drastic quantitative restrictions that are prohibited by GATT Article XI. Whereas the measures taken by the Russian Federation are clearly unjustifiable under any of the exceptions in Article XX, it is more difficult to say whether they can be justified under the security exception contained in Article XXI. The very vague wording of Article XXI indeed poses two problems: firstly, whether the use of that exception by Russia is subject to review by a WTO panel, and secondly which are the requirements imposed by the clause. The conclusions reached here is that, eventually, Article XXI is unlikely to justify the Russian ban on EU agricultural products. This is because the concept of systemic integration, as it is embodied in VCLT Article 31(3)(c), requires the interpretation of Article XXI at the light of the customary international rules on countermeasures. These norms impose conditions for the use of countermeasures which Russia is unlikely to fulfill.

[17] International Law Committee. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006). - http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf (23/06/2015).

[18] US-Shrimp (1998). Appellate Body Report. WT/DS58/AB/R, para 141.

[19] Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 15.

[20] Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) // Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2003, p. 161, para 141.

[21] United States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua // Panel Report, L/6053, dated 13 October 1986 (unadopted), paras.5.1-5.3.

[22] K.Boon. The Responsibility of International Organizations: the Controversy of Countermeasures (2009) Opinio Juris. - http://opiniojuris.org/2009/11/19/the-responsibility-of-international-organizations-the-controversy-over-countermeasures/ (23/06/2015).

[23] Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) // Judgment, 1.I.C. J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para 82.

[24] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) // Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, para 249

[25] Air Services Agreement case (France v United States). 18 R.I.A.A. 416, para 83

26 Air Services Agreement case (France v United States) 18 R.I.A.A. 416, judgments that took an opposite stance are: Military and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), Naulilaa Arbitration (Portugal v Germany)(1928) Recueil des Decisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes, vol 8. Reprinted in English (c1949) // Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. 2, p.1011.

А. Пекораро: ДСҰ құқығында қауіпсіздік мақсатында саудаға сандық шектеулер қою және алып тастау: ресейлік санкцияларды талдау.

Мақалада Еуропалық Одақта өндірілген азық-түлік импортына ресейлік эмбаргоны талдайды. Автор азық-түлікке салынған ресейлік тыйымды ГАТТ XI бабына сәйкес тыйым салынған сандық шара болып табылады деп қорытындылайды. Автор XXI бапқа сәйкес қауіпсіздік себептермен қабылданған шаралардың қолданылуына күмән білдіреді.

Түйінді сөздер: ДСҰ құқығы, дау-дамайларды шешу, ГАТТ 1994, импортты шектеу, Ресей мен ЕО арасындағы қатынастар, санкциялар, сандық шектеулер, қауіпсіздік мақсатындағы шектеулер, ДСҰ-на мүше-мемлекеттердің шаралары, кеңестер.

А. Пекораро: Количественные ограничения на торговлю и исключения в целях безопасности в праве ВТО: анализ российских санкций.

Статья посвящена анализу российского эмбарго на импорт пищевых продуктов, произведенных в Европейском Союзе. Автор приходит к выводу, что российский запрет на пищевые продукты составляет количественную меру запрещенную в соответствии со статьей XI ГАТТ. Автор высказывает сомнение в обоснованности мер, принятых в целях безопасности согласно статье XXI.

Ключевые слова: Право ВТО, разрешение споров, ГАТТ 1994, ограничение импорта, отношения между Россией и ЕС, санкции, количественные ограничения, ограничения в целях безопасности, меры государств-членов ВТО, консультации.

НОВЫЕ КНИГИ

Қазақстан Республикасы Конституциясының 20 жылдығына арналған «Конституция: бірлік, тұрақтылық, өркендеу» атты халықаралық ғылыми-практикалық конференция материалдарының жинағы (2015 ж. 28-29 тамыз) / Жалпы редакциясын басқарғандар: И.И. Рогов, А.О. Шәкіров, Е.Б. Сыдыков. – Астана: Баспа: Л.Н. Гумилев атындағы Еуразия ұлттық университеті 2015. – 494 б.

Сборник материалов международной научно-практической конференции «Конституция: единство, стабильность, процветание», посвященной 20-летию Конституции Республики Казахстан (28-29 августа 2015 г.) / Под общ. ред. И.И. Рогова, А.О. Шакирова, Е.Б. Сыдыкова. – Астана: Издательство: ЕНУ имени Л.Н. Гумилева: 2015. – 494 с.

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Қазақстан Республикасы Конституциясының 20 жылдығына арналған «Конституция: бірлік, тұрақтылық, өркендеу» атты халықаралық ғылыми-практикалық конференция материалдарының жинағында Қазақстанның мемлекеттік органдарының, бірқатар шет мемлекеттердің конституциялық бақылау органдары басшыларының, омбудсмендерінің, конституциялық соттардың және өзге де ұқсас органдар судьяларының, беделді халықаралық ұйымдар өкілдерінің, отандық және шет елдік танымал заңгер-ғалымдардың құттықтаулары мен баяндамалары енгізілді Жинақ заңгер-мамандарға және кең қауымға арналған. Барлық материалдар авторлардың баяндауында жарияланды.

В Сборник материалов международной научно-практической конференции «Конституция: единство, стабильность, процветание», посвященной 20-летию Конституции Республики Казахстан включены приветствия и доклады руководителей государственных органов Казахстана, органов конституционного контроля, омбудсменов, судей конституционных судов и иных аналогичных органов ряда зарубежных стран, представителей авторитетных международных организаций, видных отечественных и зарубежных ученых-правоведов. Сборник рассчитан на специалистов-юристов и широкий круг общественности. Все материалы опубликованы в изложении авторов.

In the collected materials of international scientific-practical conference: «Constitution: unity, stability, prosperity», devoted to the 20-th Anniversary of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan include the greetings and reports of leadership of state bodies of Kazakhstan, bodies of the constitutional control, ombudsmen, judges of the constitutional courts and correspondent bodies of the number of foreign countries, eminent home and foreign scientists .The collected materials are designed for experts - lawyers and broad sections of the general public. All the materials are published in the exposition of the authors.